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I.  Introduction 
The wage premium paid to college-educated workers in the United States rose 
dramatically during the 1980s.  Among men aged 31-35, for example, the wage differential 
between high school and college graduates grew from 18 percent in 1979-81 to 4 1 percent in 
1989-91 (Card and Lemieux 2001).
1  In light of this profound change in the U.S. wage structure, 
it is worth asking whether  all college-educated workers receive similar labor market rewards. 
While data from the Current Population Surveys enable analysts to identify trends in the college 
premium, we must turn to detailed data on individuals’ educational experiences to learn the 
sources of wage variation among college-goers in a given cohort.  Previous research in this vein 
examines the wage benefits associated with institutional quality (Loury and Garman 1995; Dale 
and Krueger 1998; Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg 1999; Hilmer 2000), two-year versus four-year 
enrollment (Grubb, 1993; Monk-Turner 1994; Kane and Rouse 1995, 1999; Leigh and Gill 
1997), a nd college degrees (Kane and Rouse 1995, 1999; Jaeger and Page 1996; Ureta and 
Welch 1998). 
In this study, we ask whether the wages of workers with identical college degrees vary 
with their college transfer patterns.  Using data from the 1979 cohort of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we first categorize college-educated workers according to their 
highest degree received.  We then consider whether they attend two-year (community) college 
only, four-year college only, or a combination of two- and f our-year institutions.  While the latter 
category defines one transfer pattern, we further subdivide the “two-year only” and “four-year 
only” categories according to whether the individual attended multiple institutions.  In contrast to 
crude, three-way distinctions between college graduates, college dropouts and others, we identify 
11 types of college-educated individuals.  By including these controls in standard wage models, 
we determine how predicted, post-school wages differ across these college categories, and the 
extent to which our detailed taxonomy reduces unexplained variation in wages.   
Our data reveal that transfer decisions are a prominent feature of students’ college-going 
experiences.   Over 45 percent of associate’s degree recipients, 28 percent of bachelor’s degree 
recipients, and 16 percent of nondegree recipients undergo a college transfer—which we define 
                                                                 
1Other studies that document this phenomenon include Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy, 
and Pierce (1993), and Katz and Autor (1999).   3
as a change in institution following no more than 11 months of nonenrollment.
2  One of the most 
striking characteristics of transfer students is that they stay in college much longer than 
nontransfer students: the gap in mean enrollment duration between transfer and nontransfer 
students is roughly one year for bachelor’s degree recipients and two years for nondegree 
recipients.  Moreover, t ransfer students often have higher levels of measured ability than 
nontransfer students and live in states with more colleges.  We control for these and other factors 
in our wage models in order to isolate the effects of transferring from the confounding effects of 
related observables.     
We find that predicted wages for transfer students are at least as large as those for 
observationally equivalent nontransfer students.  Transfers increase wages indirectly by 
facilitating graduation, but they can also have an additional, direct effect on wages.  We predict a 
direct wage premium of 6 -7 percent for bachelor’s degree recipients who transfer between four-
year colleges and for students who attend multiple two-year colleges without earning a degree.  
In general, we expect students to benefit from transferring if they succeed in finding better 
environments for skill acquisition.  Four-year college students are particularly likely to engage in 
college “matching,” given the wide range of educational opportunities available to them.  If two-
year students outside a degree track are primarily interested in job training then they, too, are 
likely to switch colleges in order to gain additional skills.  The wage premium of 6 -7 percent 
among these groups can be viewed as the average “return” to successful college matching.    
Our focus on transfer patterns as a dimension of the college-going experience 
distinguishes our research from most of the “returns to schooling” literature.  We are aware of 
only two other studies that  estimate wage models after accounting for workers’ college transfer 
status.  Kane and Rouse (1995) identify separate parameters for workers with bachelor’s and 
associate’s degrees, as well as for nondegree recipients who attend two-year college, four-year 
college, or both.  Thus, they isolate the mean wages of a particular type of transfer student: 
college dropouts who make a two- to four-year transition.  Hilmer (2000) estimates separate 
wage models for bachelor’s degree recipients who attend a single four-year college, multiple 
four-year colleges, and both two- and four-year colleges, but he assesses inter-group differences 
                                                                 
2By focusing on (nearly) contemporaneous transitions, we distinguish between transfers and 
reenrollments among former college dropouts or “stopouts.”   4
in the returns to college quality rather than predicted wages.  A number of analysts model the 
decision to transfer colleges (Velez and Javalgi 1987; Lee and Frank 1990; Jones and Lee 1992; 
Kearney, Townsend, and Kearney 1 995; Hilmer 1997) without examining labor market 
outcomes.  Rouse (1995) looks at two- to four-year transfer students’ eventual educational 
attainment, while Hilmer (1997) considers the quality of their post-transfer institutions.  This 
body of research has revealed a great deal about college transfer behavior, but we believe ours is 
the first study to offer comprehensive evidence on the wages associated with various transfer 
patterns. 
II. Why Do College Students Transfer? 
Our primary goal is to identify the wage gains associated with college transfers.  In our 
empirical analysis, we specify flexible wage models that allow the transfer premium or penalty 
to vary across transfer types.  In this section, we consider the avenues through which transfer-
wage relationships might arise. 
Information-based models of college decisions (Comay, Melnik, and Pollatschek 1973; 
Manski 1989; Altonji 1993) provide a general framework for evaluating college transfers.  These 
models take the view that college entry is an experiment￿or, stated differently, that college 
investment decisions occur in a dynamic environment and may periodically be revised.  We 
argue that students may decide to change schools after reassessing the costs and benefits of their 
investment options.   On the benefit side of the equation, students may learn about their own 
aptitudes and the academic rigors of their current (or prospective) colleges and decide that they 
would be better matched at a different institution.
3  They may also transfer in order to alter their 
course of study, perhaps after updating their beliefs about the labor market payoffs associated 
with different types of skills.  On the cost side, students may transfer to lower their tuition bill or 
living expenses, or to improve their part-time employment prospects or financial aid package.  
Of course, transferring colleges can also  increase college costs, especially when it entails longer 
enrollment durations.  Just as early-career job mobility is seen as a search for productive 
                                                                 
3Light and Strayer (2000) find that the match between measured student ability and college 
quality is an important determinant of college completion rates.  Loury and Garman (1995) 
consider the link between student-college matches and  subsequent wages.  Neither study 
considers transfer decisions explicitly.    5
employment relationships (Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b; Topel and Ward 1992), we view college 
transfers as a process of matching individuals and colleges, where the match depends on both the 
benefits and costs associated with each educational opportunity.     
If students switch colleges in pursuit of a better match, what are the implications for post-
college wages? Individual students can experience bad luck and discover  ex post that their 
transfer decisions failed to improve their match. On average, however, the transfer process 
should increase the quality of student-college matches.  As long as students focus on investment-
related college attributes in attempting to improve match quality, t ransfers will, in turn, enhance 
the probability that a degree is obtained and increase future wages.  Therefore, transfers will 
have an  indirect effect on future wages via their effect on degree attainment.  Consider students 
who begin their coursework at a two-year college and later transfer to a four-year college. If they 
succeed in improving their match via the upward transfer, they stand a good chance of receiving 
a bachelor’s degree.  If they make a “bad” transfer (and prove unable to handle the academic 
rigors of a four-year college, for example) they are unlikely to receive a bachelor’s degree.  By 
holding transfer pattern constant and comparing predicted wages of degree and nondegree 
recipients, we can assess the  indirect wage benefit of improving one’s match￿that is, the effect 
that operates via degree recipiency.   
Transfers will have a separate,  direct effect on wages if they improve opportunities for 
skill investment beyond what is reflected in the receipt of a degree.  For example, high-ability 
students who initially enroll at “run of the mill” colleges may transfer to more selective, 
academically challenging institutions, or to schools with specialized programs that match their 
academic interests.  If these transfers lead to improved training that is subsequently rewarded in 
the labor market, they have a direct effect on wages.  We can assess this effect by holding degree 
constant and comparing predicted wages of transfer and nontransfer students.
4 
There are at least two reasons why the data might fail to reveal a positive relationship 
between wages and transfers.  First, transfer decisions m ay be driven by factors unrelated to 
matching or, more accurately, unrelated to matching on investment-related criteria.  The notion 
                                                                 
4If students switch colleges solely to lower costs rather than to improve their learning 
opportunities, we would fail to observe a direct wage benefit.  We would still expect to observe 
the indirect (degree) effect if reduced financial burdens enhance the probability of earning a 
degree.      6
that early-career job mobility is an ongoing matching process has been contrasted with the 
alternative hypothesis that workers are inherently either movers or stayers. Similarly, the 
population of college switchers could be dominated by movers￿for example, students who are 
reluctant to commit to a particular academic program or institution.   Students m ay also choose 
to transfer to alter their proximity to family or friends, or upon learning more about the social 
atmospheres of alternative colleges. These students are searching for  “better” colleges, but along 
dimensions that are unlikely to affect their marketable skills (except insofar as students who 
enjoy their environment are likely to perform better in the classroom).   Second, even if students’ 
transfer decisions improve their investment opportunities and increase their future wages on 
average, we might fail to identify these intra-personal wage gains in the data.  Suppose students 
with high ability, college-oriented peers, and/or attentive high school guidance counselors make 
better initial college-related choices than other students and, as a result, are less likely to transfer.  
If these same characteristics increase wages and we do not control for them in our wage model, it 
will appear that immobility “causes” higher wages.   More generally, we will fail to identify the 
causal effects of transfers on wages if we do not control for factors that influence the transfer 
decision and also have independent effects on wages.  We defer to  Section V additional 
discussion of this endogeneity problem.  
While the decision-making we describe broadly applies to all college students, we might 
see systematic differences across segments of the college-going population. In particular, 
students who attend two-year colleges can be placed into three distinct categories (Kane and 
Rouse 1999):  (1) those who begin their coursework at a two-year college with the hope of 
transferring to a four-year college; (2) those who seek job-related training; and (3) those who 
intend to earn a vocational degree.  When students in the first category make an upward transfer 
they are, by definition, seeking a better match.  When students in the second category switch 
colleges to obtain additional job training, they may face relatively little  ex ante uncertainty about 
the opportunities available to them; they may even enroll in each training course at the behest of 
an employer.  We expect relatively few students in the third category to seek better matches 
among two-year institutions.  Whereas students attending four-year institutions have numerous 
dimensions on which to match (the quality and variety of academic programs, the quality of the 
student body, tuition costs) vocational students choose colleges on the basis of a smaller set of 
criteria, such as proximity to home or work ( Kearny, Townsend, and Kearney  1995; Kane and   7
Rouse, 1999).  With these differences in mind, we allow estimated transfer effects to vary across 
transition type (two-year to two-year, four-year to four-year, and two-year to four-year).  
III.  Data 
A. Samples 
We use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), which 
tracks the educational and labor market experiences of 12,686 men and women born in 1957-64.  
Respondents are interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially  thereafter; we use data 
for 1979-96.   
The criteria we use to select our samples are summarized in  Table 1. To identify college-
goers, we first eliminate 6,447 respondents who report no college attendance.  NLSY79 
respondents are repeatedly asked to report the entry and exit dates (month and year) and names 
of the last few colleges attended; college names are coded using Federal Interagency Committee 
on Education (FICE) codes. Anyone for whom no FICE code appears during any interview year 
is deemed not to h ave attended college.  We then eliminate 396 respondents whose college entry 
and exit dates are missing or at odds with reported high school graduation dates.  Next, we 
eliminate 1,548 respondents who attend college prior to their 1979 interview date.  By  imposing 
an analogous selection rule for our noncollege sample, we ensure that all respondents come from 
similar high school cohorts and that no early-career employment experiences precede the 
observation period.  We also eliminate 362 respondents whose FICE codes do not appear in the 
Integrated Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS), which contains detailed information on virtually 
all postsecondary institutions in the U.S.
5  This criterion ensures that all college spells we track 
are “legitimate,” and also allows us to use IPEDS to identify characteristics of each college, 
including whether it is a two-year or four-year institution.  After eliminating 536 respondents for 
whom no post-school employment is reported, we are left with a sample of 3,397 college-goers. 
The criteria we use to select a sample of noncollege-educated workers are summarized in 
the bottom panel of  Table 1.  Beginning with the 6,447 NLSY79 respondents for whom no FICE 
codes are available, we simply eliminate 59 individuals whose date of high school exit is 
unknown, 3,368 individuals who leave high school prior to their 1979 interview date and another 
                                                                 
5IPEDS data are collected by the National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. Department 
of Education.   8
162 individuals who report no post-school employment experiences.  These criteria yield a 
sample of 2,858 noncollege-goers.  We combined them with our college-goers to obtain a sample 
size of 6,255 individuals with which to estimate the wage models. 
B.  Defining college transfers   
In characterizing the college experiences of the 3,397 college-goers in our sample, we 
confine our attention to the s equence of colleges attended prior to (but possibly culminating in) 
the receipt of a bachelor’s degree.  Individuals who subsequently earn a graduate degree are 
identified as such in our wage models, but our goal is to classify individuals in terms of their 
undergraduate college enrollment.  We first determine whether the highest undergraduate degree 
received is a bachelor’s or an associate’s.  College-goers who receive neither of these degrees 
fall into the “some college, no degree” category.   
Next, we define a dummy variable to indicate whether each respondent transfers between 
colleges.  To do so, we must consider what is meant by a transfer.  We could use the broadest 
definition possible and classify as a transfer student anyone who attends multiple colleges during 
the observation period.  At the other extreme, we could consider the definition typically used by 
colleges:  transfer students are the subset of switchers who receive credit for courses completed 
at a previous institution (McCormick and Carroll 1997).  We cannot directly apply the latter 
definition because we do not know whether college switchers are granted transfer credit.  We opt 
not to use the former definition because, in our data, students leave school for as long as 10 years 
before reenrolling.  While Leigh and Gill (1997) find that individuals who earn an associate’s 
degree after a sizeable enrollment interruption receive a higher wage premium than do students 
who receive their schooling continuously, Light (1995) finds that, in general, the return to 
“interrupted” schooling is substantially lower than the return to continuous schooling.     
To avoid confounding the effects of enrollment interruptions with the effects of 
transferring, we follow individuals from their first college entry t o the start of their first 
nonenrollment spell lasting 12 months or more; anyone attending multiple colleges within that 
interval is defined as a transfer student.
6   We also experiment with three alternative definitions 
                                                                 
6  Students who return to the same college after a nonenrollment spell are not counted as transfer 
students.  Moreover, college spells that are “enclosed” in other spells are not counted; this 
excludes from the transfer category students who take a summer course at a college other than   9
in which we classify as transfers:   ( 1) all college switches; ( 2) all college switches prior to age 
26; and ( 3) all college switches after dropping from the sample individuals whose nonenrollment 
spells account for more than 20 percent of the elapsed time from first college entry to last college 
exit. Although we do not report results based on these alternative definitions, in  Sections IV and 
V we indicate the extent to which our findings are sensitive to the definition used.     
C. Variables  
Most estimates of the returns to schooling are based on cross-sectional data, but we use 
multiple wages reported by workers after receiving their highest degree.  Our regression sample 
contains 48,266 wage observations for 6,255 workers.
7   If we instead drew a cross-section based 
on elapsed time since  school exit, we would have virtually no variation in work experience.  A 
cross-section drawn from a particular interview year would induce a strong correlation between 
schooling attainment and experience.  We avoid both problems by using multiple wages for each 
respondent.   Although no sample member is observed beyond age 40, we are able to maximize 
the available variation in work experience and estimate a conventional, life-cycle wage profile.         
Summary statistics for the variables used in our wage  models appear in  Table 2.  The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average, hourly wage divided by the implicit 
price deflator for gross domestic product.  The covariates can be grouped into three categories: 
schooling measures, non-schooling baseline variables, and an additional set of variables (ability, 
college enrollment duration,  and so forth) that prove to be related to college enrollment patterns.  
The schooling measures include 11 dummy variables that classify college-educated workers 
according to degree (none, associate’s, bachelor’s), transfer status (yes or no), and college type 
(two-year only, four-year only, or both).  We identify noncollege-goers’ schooling attainment 
with three additional dummy variables indicating whether they  have a high school degree (the 
omitted schooling group), drop out of high school after completing grade eight, or drop out at an 
earlier grade level.  We also control for whether workers hold a graduate degree; everyone in this 
category is identified as a bachelor’s degree recipient as well.   
Our additional baseline covariates are dummy variables indicating whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
their primary institution.   
7We use wages reported through 1996, or until the last interview date of respondents who drop 
out of the survey.   Each respondent contributes, at most, one wage observation per survey year.     10 
respondent is male, black, and Hispanic, calendar year dummies, and continuous measures of 
actual work experience.  We define experience as the cumulative number of hours worked from 
the 20
th birthday to the date the wage is earned, divided by 2,000 for conversion to full-time, full-
year equivalents.
8   Our goal is to control for all post-school work experience, plus in-school 
experience from age 20 onward. Because some individuals leave school prior to their 20
th 
birthday, we also control for cumulative hours worked (divided by 2,000) from school exit until 
the 20
th birthday; this variable equals zero for anyone leaving school after age 20.  Failure to 
control for in-school experience causes its wage-enhancing effects to be absorbed by the college 
variables (Light 2001).  Transfer students gain relatively more work experience than nontransfer 
students, so the omitted variable bias would potentially be greater for our key covariates.
9   
As we demonstrate in the next section, transfer and nontransfer students tend to differ in 
their measured ability, the number of colleges in their state, and the cumulative duration of their 
undergraduate enrollment.  We control for ability using respondents’ percentile scores on the 
Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).
10  From IPEDS, we obtain the number of two- and four-
year colleges in each student’s state in the year he/she finished high school (if a noncollege-goer) 
or began  the first college spell (if a college-goer).  We divide these figures by the number of 18-
26 year old residents in the same state-year cell.  These variables are intended to measure the 
number of in-state alternatives facing respondents as  they make their college matching decisions; 
if we omit the denominator or control for total enrollment  (number of seats, rather than number 
of schools) as a percent of the college-aged population, we obtain virtually identical results.  
Using self-reported entry and exit dates (month and year) of each college attended prior to 
                                                                 
8We construct this measure from the weekly hours worked variables in the NLSY79 Work 
History file.  These variables account for within- and between-job gaps and dual job-holding, and 
are available for every week from 1978 forward.  We choose to initialize work experience at a 
uniform date for  each respondent (the  twentieth  birthday) rather than at an endogenously 
determined date such as the start of the first job.  Any date that depends on high school exit or 
first jobs would occur before 1978 for some respondents, thus causing their measured experience 
to be left-censored. 
9Our estimated schooling coefficients are invariant to whether we control separately for in-school 
and post-school work experience or measure them cumulatively, so we take the more 
parsimonious approach. 
10The NLSY79 provides  approximate AFQT scores for respondents who took the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery in 1980.  An AFQT score is unavailable for 4 percent of 
sample members so we assign them the mean value for their degree/transfer category.   11 
receiving a bachelor’s degree, we also measure the cumulative number of months each college-
goer spends in two-year colleges and four-year colleges.  The enrollment duration variables 
equal zero for individuals who do not attend college.  
IV.  Degree Recipiency and College Transfer Patterns 
Table 3 shows how the 3,397 college-goers in our sample are classified in terms of 
highest degrees received and college enrollment patterns.  The bottom row shows that students in 
the “some college, no degree” category are the least likely to transfer.  Just over 16 percent of 
these students transfer, compared to 45 percent of students who eventually receive associate’s 
degrees and 28 percent of bachelor’s degree recipients.
11  The “some college” students who 
transfer are distributed quite evenly among two-year to two-year transitions (5.7 percent of the 
sample), four-year to four-year transitions (5 percent) and transitions from two-year to four-year 
institutions (5.4 percent).  Associate’s degree recipients are much more likely to transfer from 
two-year to four-year colleges (34.2 percent) than among two-year colleges (11.2 percent).  
Among bachelor’s degree recipients, 15.1 percent start their postsecondary schooling at a two-
year college before transferring, while  the remaining  13.1 percent switch among four-year 
colleges.   
Table 3 also allows us to see how degree recipiency varies by college enrollment pattern.  
Among students who attend a single two-year college, 18.7 percent (244 out of 1,304) ultimately 
receive an associate’s degree.  While this number is close to the 16 percent graduation rate 
reported in Kane and Rouse (1999), it masks the fact that the relatively few students who attend 
multiple two-year colleges are considerably  more likely to receive a degree: their graduation rate 
is 32 percent (50 out of 156).  Among students who attend only four-year institutions, the 
graduation rate does not vary significantly by transfer status; 61 percent end up with a bachelor’s 
degree regardless of whether or not they attend multiple colleges.  Only 24 percent (100 out of 
417) of students who attend both two- and four-year colleges end up without a college degree, 
                                                                 
11The bottom row of  Table 3 can be compared to appendix Table A-1, where we report transfer 
rates corresponding to the alternative transfer definitions described in  Section III B.  If we count 
all college switches  (Definition 1)  we gain many more transfers: for example, 26 percent of 
“some college” students transfer, compared to 16 percent with our preferred definition.   The 
transfer rates reported in  Table 3 are intermediate to what we find using the second and third 
alternative definitions.   12 
although individuals in this category  are less likely to earn bachelor’s degrees than are students 
in the “four-year only” category.   In summary, Table 3 reveals that (a) transfers are surprisingly 
prevalent, (b) transitions between two- and four-year colleges represent only half of all transfers, 
and (c) transfer decisions do not appear to detract from the probability of degree attainment.   
In  Table 4, we ask how transfer and nontransfer students compare in other dimensions of 
their college-related experiences.  For each of the 11 college “types,” we compute the mean 
AFQT score, number of in-state colleges as a percent of the college-aged population, and 
cumulative enrollment duration.  Table 4 reveals that transfer students often have higher mean 
AFQT scores (measured ability) than their nontransfer counterparts. This is especially true in the 
“some college, no degree” category: students who attend a single two-year college have a mean 
AFQT score of 38.7, while the mean for students who attend multiple two-year colleges is eight 
percentile points higher.  An even larger gap is seen among transfer and nontransfer students 
who attend four-year colleges without earning degrees, while the mean AFQT score for students 
who combine two- and four-year colleges (48.4) lies between the means for the other two 
transfer categories.  Among associate’s and bachelor’s degree holders, the transfer-nontransfer 
gap in mean AFQT scores is much smaller and not always statistically significant.  Not 
surprisingly, associate’s degree recipients who attend four-year c olleges have the highest mean 
AFQT score (51.4) in their degree category, while bachelor’s degree recipients who attend two-
year colleges have the lowest mean score (60.2) in their category.   
Table 4 also reveals whether observed transfers are linked to t he number of colleges 
available in the market, which we define as the state of residence.  By drawing once again on the 
job mobility literature, we predict that students who face a relatively dense distribution of 
potential colleges are able to “match”—that is, switch colleges—at lower cost than students who 
face a sparse distribution.  The availability of two-year colleges differs dramatically across states 
(Rouse 1998), so a more specific prediction is that transitions among (and from) two-year 
colleges a re concentrated in certain states.  If states with a high density of colleges differ 
systematically from other states in their wage structure, our estimated transfer effects could 
simply reflect the effects of living and working in college-rich states.  Table 4  contains mixed 
evidence on the correlation between transfers and numbers of colleges. Among “some college” 
students, those who transfer between two-year colleges live in states that average 2.22 two-year 
colleges per 100,000 college-aged residents, w hich is  fewer than the average ratio of 2.46 for   13 
their nontransfer counterparts.  The  mean number  of four-year colleges is  roughly the same 
(about 1.75 per 100,000 college-aged residents)  among transfer and nontransfer students who 
attend four-year colleges without receiving a degree.  However, associate’s degree recipients 
who attend multiple two-year colleges live in states with significantly more two-year colleges 
(2.72 per 100,000) than do their nontransfer counterparts (2.31); a similar pattern is seen for 
four-year colleges in the bachelor’s degree sample.  
The statistics in  Table 4 demonstrate that transfer students spend significantly more time 
enrolled in college than do nontransfer students.    For example, nondegree recipients who attend 
two-year  colleges remain in school for 1.5 years, on average, if they attend a single college and 
3.2 years if they transfer.  While transfer students in the “some college” category are typically 
enrolled for twice as long as their nontransfer counterparts, the extra enrollment associated with 
switching schools is somewhat smaller among degree recipients.  Among bachelor’s degree 
holders, the average enrollment duration of transfer students is about one year (or 25 percent) 
longer than that of nontransfer students.   Among associate’s degree recipients, students who 
attend multiple two-year colleges stay in school an average of one year (or 50 percent) longer 
than students who attend a single school.  Associate’s degree recipients who attend both two- and 
four-year colleges tend to be enrolled for more than twice as long as are nontransfer students. 
On average, transfer students have higher measured ability and stay in college longer than 
their counterparts who attend a single college. In many instances, they also live in states with 
more of the type of college (two-year or four-year) to which they end up transferring.  The 
models presented in the next section are designed to isolate the wage effects of switching 
colleges from the effects of ability, college availability, and longer enrollment duration.
12   
V.  Wage Models 
A. Labor Market Returns to Degrees and College Transfer Patterns 
                                                                 
12We also investigated differences  in college quality—an inherently difficult characteristic to 
measure, especially when we need a metric that applies to both two-year and four-year colleges.  
We find positive correlations between transfers and college expenditures and, among four-year 
students, a weak, positive correlation between transfers and median SAT scores of incoming 
freshmen.  However, none of these measures have any effect on our estimated coefficients of 
interest.  Hilmer (1997, 2000) provides detailed evidence on the relationship between transfers 
and college quality.     14 
To assess the wage effects of workers’ college degrees and transfer patterns, we estimate 
variants of the following wage model:  
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where the dependent variable is the log of the average hourly wage earned by worker i at time t, 
it X  represents the nonschooling-related controls described in  Section III, and
it e represents 
unobserved  factors.  The remaining variables in (1) identify workers’ schooling levels.
   Workers 
who do not attend college are classified as high school dropouts with no more than eight years of 
school ( i DROP8 ), high school dropouts with more than eight years of school ( i DROP11 ), or 
high school graduates (the omitted group). College-educated workers are classified by dummy 
variables identifying their degree and/or college type(s) ( ik D ) and transfer status ( i T ).   
In our first specification, we ignore college transfer status ( that is,  impose the constraint 
k g =0) and define three ik D to identify college-goers as “some college, no degree,” associate’s 
degree recipients, or bachelor’s degree recipients. In the second specification, we expand ik D to 
seven elements by dividing each degree category according to whether the individual attended 
two-year college only, four-year college only, or both.   In  Specification 3, we interact the same 
seven  ik D with  i T  to distinguish between transfer and nontransfer students.  This gives us the 11 
college categories summarized in  Tables 3 -4, although it is important to recognize that  k g in (1) 
identifies  marginal effects of each transfer category.  We cannot separately identify k b and  k g for 
students who attend both two- and four-year colleges because  i T always equals one.   
As described in  Section III, the sample used to estimate variants of model (1) contains 
48,266 wage observations for 6,255 workers.  We use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate 
the models, and we report robust standard errors that account for nonindependence of 
observations within person-specific clusters.  
An important strand of the “returns to schooling” literature uses instrumental variables 
estimation and other methods to account for the endogeneity of schooling attainment (see Card 
1999 for a review).  In our application, the dummy variables  ik D and  i T  are endogenous if 
different types of college students are inherently different in terms of unmeasured ability and   15 
other factors contained in it e .  Moreover,  transitory, unobserved  factors that drive transfer 
decisions ( such as  expectations about the  labor market  payoffs associated with a new course of 
study) m ay  also affect  post-college wages.  However, the extension of instrumental variables 
methods to models that replace highest grade completed with indicators of degree recipiency and 
college enrollment patterns is far from trivial, for the “first stage” entails a sequence of 
multinomial, discrete choices.  Rather than attempt to estimate a very complicated choice model 
jointly with the wage model, w e follow Kane and Rouse (1995) in relying on ability measures 
(AFQT scores) to control for factors that drive students’ college-going decisions; we also control 
for enrollment duration and in-state college availability.  If  ik D and  i T continue to be correlated 
with it e , then we fail to identify causal effects of various college patterns on subsequent wages.    
 Estimates for the first two specifications are presented in  Columns 1 -2 of Table 5.
13  
These are comparable to the specifications reported in Kane and Rouse (1995), Jaeger and Page 
(1996), Leigh and Gill (1997), and Ureta and Welch (1998), and are intended to serve as 
benchmarks.  The Column  1 estimates indicate that, all else equal, individuals who attend college 
without receiving a degree are predicted to earn 21 percent more than high school graduates 
(exp(.193)-1), associate’s degree recipients are predicted to earn 33 percent more, and bachelor’s 
degree recipients are predicted to earn 62 percent more.  When we sort individuals in each 
degree category according to whether they attend two-year colleges, four-year colleges, or both 
(Column  2), it becomes evident that considerable heterogeneity exists within some of these 
groups.  Predicted log-wages of nondegree holders who attend four-year college(s) exceed those 
of their counterpart who attend two-year college(s) by 0.07 (0.237-0.167), while the predicted 
log-wages of individuals who attend two- and four-year colleges lie in between.  Associate’s 
degree holders are predicted to receive a 0.04 log-wage premium if they advance to a four-year 
college, while bachelor’s degree recipients have virtually the same p redicted wage regardless of 
whether they attend a two-year institution. 
In  Columns  3-5, we add transfer interactions to distinguish among the 11 categories of 
college-educated workers described in preceding sections.  In  Column 4 we add AFQT scores 
and measures of  college availability (the number of public two- and four-year colleges in the 
                                                                 
13Table 5 contains estimates for k b and  k g only. Additional parameter estimates are in appendix 
Table A-2.       16 
state per 100,000 college-aged residents) to our set of controls, and in Column 5 we add 
enrollment duration as well.   Specification 5 is our  preferred  model, so  we use  it t o draw 
detailed inferences about the direct and indirect wage effects of transferring.  We then consider 
how these findings are affected when we fail to account for worker ability, college availability, 
and enrollment duration (Columns 3-4). 
Focusing  first on students who attend  only two-year colleges, the  Column  5 estimates 
reveal the following.  First, among workers who attend a single two-year college, those with an 
associate’s degree are predicted to earn 9 percent more than those without a degree (exp(0.173-
0.088)-1).  When transferring among two-year colleges leads to an associate’s degree, this is the 
amount by which wages are expected to increase—it is the indirect effect of transferring defined 
in  Section II.  Second, among students with an associate’s degree, predicted wages are virtually 
identical for those who transfer and those who do not; the estimated coefficient for the transfer 
interaction is –0.028, with a standard error more than twice as large.  In other words, associate’s 
degree recipients receive no  direct effect beyond the value of the degree. Third, among students 
in the “some college” category, the direct effect of transferring is 7 percent, although this 
estimate is statistically significant at only an 8 percent significance level.  Transfer students in 
this category fail to earn the 9 percent wage premium associated with a degree, but instead 
receive a 7 percent premium as a result of the additional skills acquired at their second college.   
It appears we are looking at two distinct populations of two-year college students:  those 
working toward a vocational degree, and those seeking job training. The former are likely to be 
heavily represented in the sample of two-year attendees who earn an associate’s degree.   Only 
11 percent o f these individuals switch colleges ( Table 3) and, when they do, they are not 
necessarily seeking better investment opportunities. As we argue in  Section II, such criteria as 
academic programs and teacher quality may be less important than location for vocational 
students.  Transferring may lower commuting costs and enhance the likelihood of graduation (as 
shown in  Table 3), but it is not a mechanism for improving the learning experience.  However, 
the story is very different for two-year students who do not earn a degree—a population that, in 
all likelihood, is dominated by students in pursuit of job training.  As  noted  in  Section II, these 
individuals may attend a second two-year college because they are confident additional training 
will be rewarded in the labor market￿and their employers may even send them for additional   17 
training.  Our finding that nondegree recipients receive a direct return to transferring w hile 
degree recipients do not is consistent with this notion of a dual two-year college population.
14  
We now turn to the estimates in Column 5 of Table 5 for students who attend only four-
year colleges.   Comparing the estimated coefficient for four-year students in the “some college” 
(four-year college only) category to the corresponding estimate for bachelor’s degree holders, we 
find that a bachelor’s degree is associated with 14 percent higher predicted wages (exp(0.237-
0.105)-1).  This is the indirect effect of transferring.  Holding degree attainment constant, we 
find the difference in predicted l og-wages for transfer and nontransfer students is 0.061 for 
bachelor’s degree recipients and an imprecisely estimated 0.022 for nondegree holders.  In 
contrast to what we find for two-year college students, it is now the degree holders who earn a 
direct return to switching colleges￿that is, a 6 percent wage premium in addition to the 14 
percent associated with the bachelor’s degree.    To interpret these findings, we reconsider the 
decision-making process described in  Section II.  Students who switch colleges might (a) 
succeed in finding a better environment in which to acquire skills, (b) seek a better environment, 
but discover  ex post that they are no better off, or (c) be driven by factors unrelated to skill 
investment.  The first group is more likely than the others to earn a bachelor’s degree, so the 6 
percent wage premium can be viewed as the value of “successful” college matching.
15  
To complete our discussion of the  Column  5 estimates, we consider students who attend 
both two-year and four-year colleges.   Among these upward transfer students, an associate’s 
degree is estimated to be worth 10 percent (exp(0.144-0.047)-1) and the additional premium for a 
bachelor’s degree is estimated to be 7 percent (exp(0.210-0.144)-1).  Holding degree attainment 
constant and comparing across transfer patterns, we find a gap in predicted log-wages of only 
0.03 between associates’ degree holders who attend a single two-year college and those who 
                                                                 
14These results are robust to changes in the definition of transfer.  That is, t he large, positive, 
direct effect that we estimate for nondegree recipients and the zero effect that we estimate for 
associate’s degree recipients are unrelated to the timing of transfers.  
15Among all the estimates in  Table 5, the coefficient for the four-year/transfer interaction among 
bachelor’s degree recipients is the only one that is highly sensitive to the definition of transfer.  If 
we relax the definition to include all college switches regardless of the length of intervening 
nonenrollment spells (Definition 1), the estimated coefficient falls from 0.061 to zero.  This 
reflects the fact that individuals who return to college to complete a bachelor’s degree earn 
substantially less than those who receive their schooling continuously.   18 
subsequently attend a four-year college without graduating.  We estimate a s imilar gap in 
predicted log-wages between bachelor’s degree recipients who attend one four-year college and 
those who first attend a two-year college.  In short, the predicted wages of upward transfer 
students are almost entirely attributable to their highest degree received.  Switching colleges 
before or after the degree has no additional (direct) effect on wages.      
We now turn to Columns 3-4 of Table 5 to learn how our inferences change when we fail 
to control for student ability (AFQT scores), college availability (in-state colleges per 100,000 
college-aged residents), and total enrollment duration.
16  We find two major changes.  First, 
omitting these controls leads to larger estimated wage gaps between bachelor’s degree recipients 
and other college-educated workers.  In Column 3, the estimated return to a bachelor’s degree for 
students who attend only four-year colleges is 29 percent (exp(0.478-0.226)-1), which is double 
the 14 percent seen in  Column  5.  Among individuals who attend both two- and four-year 
colleges, advancing from an associate’s degree to a bachelor’s degree increases predicted wages 
by 17 percent (exp(0.466-0.313)-1), versus 7 percent in  Column  5. Individuals who earn a 
bachelor’s degree are significantly more able and stay in college s ignificantly longer than all 
other college students.  Failure to control for the wage-enhancing effects of these correlated 
factors causes us to overstate the value-added of a bachelor’s degree. 
In addition, we find that the direct effect of switching colleges is often larger in Columns 
3-4  than in  Column  5. For example, among “some college” students, the direct effect of 
switching among two-year colleges is 0.124 and 0.090 in  Columns 3 and 4, respectively, versus 
an imprecisely estimated 0.070 in  Column 5.  Similarly, the estimated, direct effect of switching 
among four-year colleges falls from 0.093 to 0.061 to 0.022 as we move from Columns 3 to 4 to 
5.  Only the estimated effect for associate’s degree recipients who switch among two-year 
colleges remains  the same (“zero”) in all three specifications.  As we saw in  Table 4, transfer 
students tend to have higher levels of measured ability and to stay in college longer than their 
nontransfer counterparts.   A portion of the gross relationship between college  transfers and 
wages is a “return” to high ability and longer college enrollment.   
B. Variance decompositions 
                                                                 
16Most of the differences between the Column 3 and Column  4 estimates are due to the inclusion 
of AFQT scores.    19 
In the preceding section, we assessed the predicted wage gaps among 11 types of college-
educated workers.  In this section, we ask if our 11-dimensional taxonomy improves upon less 
detailed classification schemes in its ability to explain variation in wages.  A good schooling 
taxonomy groups observations in such a way that wages within each category are similar, 
holding constant other observed characteristics.  Variation about the group mean for a particular 
category should be small, while mean differences across categories should be relatively large.
17   
In Table 6, we report measures of within-category and between-category variances in 
log-wages, using three alternative schooling taxonomies: the three college categories (no degree, 
associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree) presented in  Column  1 of  Table 5, the seven categories 
presented in  Column  2, and the 11 categories used in  Columns 3 -5.  Each taxonomy also 
includes the three noncollege categories used in all specifications in Table 5.    
To compute the variance of log-wages within each schooling category, we begin with the 
residuals from a regression of log-wages on each of the nonschooling covariates used in 
Columns  1-3.  We do not control for AFQT scores, number of colleges, or college enrollment 
duration.  Following Ureta and Welch (1998), we first top-code and bottom-code log-wages to 
the values corresponding to the ninety-eighth and second percentiles, respectively.  The residuals 
can be interpreted as log-wages “conditional” on the various baseline characteristics included in 
the model.  In order to eliminate within-person variation in log-wages, we compute the mean 
residual for each person.  These average residuals are then regressed on the schooling-related 
covariates.   
The columns labeled “within-category variance” in  Table 6 show the within-category 
log-wage variance about the category-specific mean log-wage, expressed as a percentage of the 




















100   , 
where i denotes the worker, k denotes the schooling category, and N and Nk represent the number 
                                                                 
17See Ureta and Welch (1998) for a detailed discussion of these issues.  They conduct a variance 
decomposition similar to what we present here to compare the old (pre-1992) and new schooling 
taxonomies in the Current Population Survey.   20 
of observations in the entire sample and category k , respectively.  These category-specific 
measures reveal which schooling groups contain above-average or below-average variation in 
log-wages.   Focusing on the simplest taxonomy presented in  Column 1, we find that bachelor’s 
degree recipients have a relative, within-category variance of 129.32, meaning this group’s wage 
variation is 29 percent larger than the overall sample wage variation.  In contrast, the within-
category wage variance for high school graduates is 73 percent of overall sample wage variation.   
When we switch to  the second t axonomy  (Column  2), we find that the within-category wage 
variance for both bachelor’s degree categories is 20-30 percent larger than the overall sample 
variation.  In our Column 3 taxonomy, all three bachelor’s degree categories and four of the five 
non-bachelor’s transfer categories have above-average wage variation. 
The second measure of within-category log-wage variance presented in  Table 6 is 
obtained by weighting the first measure by the sample share in each category  ). / ( N Nk  These 
weighted averages determine the portion of sample log-wage variation that is attributable to each 
schooling category. Looking again at the bachelor’s degree category in  Column 1, we find a 
weighted, within-category variance of 19.03.  This implies that 19  percent of the overall log-
wage variance can be explained by variation within this category.   The variation in wages within 
the high school diploma category, which contains over 40 percent of all observations in the 
sample, represents 30 percent of overall wage variation.  Using  the third taxonomy, we find that 
each college transfer category accounts for no more than 2.4 percent of overall wage variation, 
largely because their sample shares are relatively small.  
At the bottom of  Table 6, we report the sum of the weighted, within-category variances 
for each taxonomy.  These sums give the portion of total log-wage variance that is unexplained 
by the schooling categories, or 1 -R
2 from a regression of log-wages on the schooling-related 
variables. As we move to increasingly refined taxonomies, we hope to improve the explanatory 
power of the schooling variables.  Table 6 reveals that each refinement results in a slightly 
smaller weighted, within-category log-wage variance than the 89.85 seen for  Taxonomy 1 —or, 
put differently, a slightly larger R
2.   Our second taxonomy increases the R
2 by 1.8 percent, from 
10.15 to 10.33, and  Taxonomy 2 increases it by 4 percent.  Both changes are statistically 
significant.
18   
                                                                 
18If we instead use the most liberal of our alternative transfer definitions in which all college   21 
Does the small improvement in  R
2 between  Columns 1 and 3 indicate that the addition of 
detailed controls for workers’ college enrollment patterns are warranted?  Conditional on the fact 
that schooling variables explain only 10-11 percent of log-wage variance in the NLSY79, an  R
2 
increase of 0.40 (from 10.15  to 10.55) is not inconsequential.  To put these numbers in 
perspective, we note that Ureta and Welch (1998) compare  seven-way and 16-way schooling 
taxonomies using data from the Current Population Survey, and find that the R
2 changes by only 
0.27 (from 22.72 to 22.99).  Regardless of the data source, we cannot expect additional schooling 
categories to have a dramatic effect on explanatory power.  It is noteworthy that most of the 
change in  R
2 between  Columns  1 and 3 comes from disaggregating the sample of w orkers who 
attend college without receiving degrees.  In our first taxonomy, the sole “some college, no 
degree” category accounts for 25.14 percent of the overall log-wage variance.  In  Column  3, the 
variation in wages within the five “some college” categories accounts for 24.84 percent of the 
overall variance.  This change of 0.3 represents 75 percent of the improvement in  R
2 between 
Columns 1 and 3.  In short, the modest gain in explanatory power achieved by the detailed 
taxonomy is primarily attributable to detailed knowledge of the college enrollment patterns of 
nondegree recipients—not surprisingly, the same group for which predicted log-wages vary 
significantly across transfer categories.  Our findings indicate that refinements to the catch-all 
“some college, no degree” category improve our ability to explain variation in wages.
19           
VI.  Concluding Comments 
Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we classify college 
students by degree attainment (no degree, associate’s, or bachelor’s), college type (two-year, 
four-year, or both) and transfer status.  We use this detailed, 11-dimensional taxonomy to learn 
about the causes and consequences of college transfers and, more generally, to assess wage 
differences within the population of college-educated workers.  Based on our comprehensive 
analysis of the data, we conclude the following: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
switches are counted as transfers (Definition 1), the R
2 increases by 7 percent.   
19The recently revised schooling taxonomy used by the Current Population Survey and decennial 
Census continues to combine all workers in the “some college, no degree” category.  Ureta and 
Welch (1998) term this category a “clear mistake” because of its sizeable contribution to overall 
log-wage variation.  Our findings confirm their suspicion that gains in predictive power can be 
realized by disaggregating this group.   22 
Transfer students are at least as likely as nontransfer students to earn a degree.  Among 
students who attend only two-year colleges, transfer students earn an associate’s degree at a 
higher rate than nontransfer students.  Among students who attend only four-year colleges, 
transfer and nontransfer students are equally likely to receive a bachelor’s degree.  The majority 
of students who attend both  two- and four-year colleges earn either an associate’s or bachelor’s 
degree. 
In terms of post-college wages, transferring does no harm to the average student and is 
often beneficial.  To the extent that transferring leads to the receipt of a degree, it has an indirect 
effect on wages.  We find that transfers have an additional, direct effect on wage for two types of 
workers:  four-year transfer students who wind up with a bachelor’s degree, and two-year 
transfer students who earn no degree (and, therefore, are likely to be in college primarily for job 
training).  Both are predicted to earn 6 -7 percent higher wages than observationally equivalent 
workers who do not transfer.  We believe these workers are identifiable ex post as having sought 
(and found) better investment opportunities via their transfers; we view their  direct wage 
premium as the return to successful college matching. 
Our 11-dimensional taxonomy produces a modest improvement in explanatory power 
relative to a more conventional breakdown between associate’s degree holders, bachelor’s degree 
holders, and nondegree recipients.  Our schooling measures explain roughly 10 percent of the 
variance in log-wage, and moving from three to 11 controls increases this amount by 4 percent.  
Despite the inherent noisiness of the data, we find considerable differences in the predicted 
wages of our 11 categories of college-educated workers.  Transfer status, college type and, of 
course, degree attainment are important determinants of how much a college-goer will eventually 
earn.  Estimates of  “the” college wage premium mask a great deal of heterogeneity among 
college-educated workers. 
 
   23 
 References 
Altonji, Joseph G. 1993. “The Demand for and Return to Education When Education Outcomes 
Are Uncertain.”  Journal of Labor Economics 11(1, part1):48-83. 
Brewer, Dominic J., Eric R. Eide and Ronald G. Ehrenberg.  1999. “Does It Pay to Attend an 
Elite Private College? Cross-Cohort Evidence on the Effects of College Type on Earnings.”  
Journal of Human Resources 34(1):104-123. 
Card, David.  1999.  “The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings.”  In  Handbook of Labor 
Economics 3A, eds. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card.  Amsterdam:  North-Holland.  
           and Thomas Lemieux.  2001. “Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising Return to College 
for Younger Men?  A Cohort-Based Analysis.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2):705-
746. 
Comay, Yochanan, Arie Melnik and Moshe A. Pollatschek.  1973.  “The Option Value of 
Education and the Optimal Path for Investment in Human Capital.”  International Economic 
Review 14(2):421-35. 
Dale, Stacey Berg and Alan B. Krueger.  1998.  “Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More 
Selective College:  An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables.”  
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4):1491-1528. 
Grubb, W. Norton.  1993.  “The Varied Economic Returns of Postsecondary Education: New 
Evidence from the Class of 1972.”  Journal of Human Resources 28(2):365-82. 
Hilmer, Michael J.  1997.  “Does Community College Attendance Provide a Strategic Path to a 
Higher Quality Education?”  Economics of Education Review 16(1):59-68.  
          .  2000.  “Does the Return to University Quality Differ for Transfer Students and Direct 
Attendees?”  Economics of Education Review 19(1):47-61.  
Jaeger, David A. and Marianne E. Page.  1996.  “Degrees Matter: New Evidence on Sheepskin 
Effects in the Returns to Education.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 78(4):733-740.  
Jones, Janis Cox and Beth S. Lee.  1992.  “Moving On: A Cooperative Study of Student 
Transfer.”  Research in Higher Education 33(1):125-140. 
Jovanovic, Boyan. 
 1979(a).  “Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover.”  Journal of Political 
Economy 87(5, part1):972-990. 
          . 1 979(b).  “Firm-Specific Capital and Turnover.”  Journal of Political Economy 
87(6):1246-1260. 
Juhn, Chinhui, Kevin M. Murphy and Brooks Pierce. 1993.  “Wage Inequality and the Rise in 
Returns to Skill.” Journal of Political Economy 101(3):410-442. 
Kane, Thomas J. and Cecilia Elena Rouse. 1995. “Labor Market Returns to Two- and Four-Year 
College.”  American Economic Review 85(3):600-614. 
          .  1999. “Community College: Educating Students at the Margin between School and 
Work.”  Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(1):63-84. 
Katz, Lawrence F. and David H. Autor. 1999. “Inequality in the Labor Market.”  In Handbook of 
Labor Economics 3A, eds. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card,   Amsterdam:  North-Holland.    24 
            and Kevin M. Murphy. 1992.  “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and 
Demand Factors.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(1):35-78. 
Kearney, Gretchen Warner, Barbara K. Townsend, and Terrence J. Kearney. 1995. “Multiple-
Transfer Students in a Public Urban University:  Background Characteristics and 
Interinstitutional Movements.”  Research in Higher Education 36(3):323-344. 
Lee, Valerie E. and Kenneth A. Frank.  1990.  “Students’ Characteristics that Facilitate the 
Transfer from Two-year to Four-year Colleges.”  Sociology of Education 63(3):178-93. 
Leigh, Duane E. and Andrew M. Gill.  1997. “Labor Market Returns to Community Colleges: 
Evidence for Returning Adults.”  Journal of Human Resources 32(2):334-53. 
Light, Audrey. 1995. “The Effects of Interrupted Schooling on Wages.”  Journal of Human 
Resources 30(3):472-502. 
          .  2 001. “In-School Work Experience and the Returns to Schooling.”  Journal of Labor 
Economics 19(1):65-93. 
           and Wayne Strayer.  2000.  “Determinants of College Completion:  School Quality or 
Student Ability?”  Journal of Human Resources 35(3):299-332. 
Loury, Linda Datcher and David Garman. 1995. “College Selectivity and Earnings.”  Journal of 
Labor Economics 13(2):289-308. 
Manski, Charles F.  1989. “Schooling as Experimentation: A Reappraisal of the Postsecondary 
Dropout Phenomenon.”  Economics of Education Review 8(4):305-312. 
McCormick, Alexander C. and C. Dennis Carroll.  1997.  “Transfer Behavior Among Beginning 
Postsecondary Students: 1989-94.”  Statistical Analysis Report NCES97-266, National Center 
for Education Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education. 
Monk-Turner, Elizabeth. 1994.  “Economic Returns to Community and Four-Year College 
Education.”  Journal of Socio-Economics 23(4):441-447. 
Rouse, Cecilia Elena. 1995.  “Democratization or Diversion?  The Effect of Community 
Colleges on Education Attainment.”  Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 13(2):217-
24. 
          .  1998. “Do Two-Year Colleges Increase Overall Educational Attainment?  Evidence from 
the States.”  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 17(4): 595-620. 
Topel, Robert H. and Michael P. Ward. 1992. “Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men.”   
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(2):439-479. 
Ureta, Manuelita and Finis Welch. 1998.  “Measuring Educational Attainment: the Old and the 
New Census and BLS Taxonomies.”  Economics of Education Review 17(1): 15-30. 
Velez, W. and Rajshekhar G. Javalgi.  1987. “Two-year College to Four-year College: The 
Likelihood of Transfer.”  American Journal of Education 96(1):81-94.   25 






prior row  
 
Reason for deletion 
    12,686 
   
NLSY79 respondents in 1979  
-6,447    50.8  Report no college attendance (no FICE code)  
￿￿￿ 






- 396  6.3  6.3  No dates reported for college entry/exit, or dates 
cannot be reconciled with high school exit  
——— 




















   










   
NLSY79 respondents in 1979 
   - 6,239    49.2  Report college attendance (at least one FICE code)  
——— 







-59  0.9  0.9  High school exit date indeterminate 
——— 





















   
Noncollege sample 
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Table 2:  Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Variables Used in Wage Models 
Variable  Full sample  
Nonzero 
obsns. only 
Dependent variable     
Natural logarithm of average hourly wage
a   2.07   
(0.61) 
 
Schooling and baseline covariates     
1 if received no high school diploma, highest grade£8  0.03   
1 if received no high school diploma, highest grade>8  0.13   
1 if attended some college, received no degree   0.24   
1 if received associate’s degree  0.05   
1 if received bachelor’s degree or higher  0.15   
1 if received master’s, doctorate or professional degree  0.02   
1 if male  0.56   
1 if black  0.26   
1 if Hispanic  0.18   
Cumulative years of work experience since 20
th birthday
 b  5.16 
(4.01) 
 
Cumulative years of work experience before 20
th birthday




Additional covariates     
Percentile score, Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT)  36.84 
(26.67) 
 












Cumulative duration of enrollment in two-year colleges 





Cumulative duration of enrollment in four-year colleges 





Number of person-year observations  48,266   
Number of individuals  6,255   
a Divided by implicit price deflator for gross domestic product; base year is 1992. 
b Cumulative hours worked from week of 20
th birthday to week wage is earned, divided by 2,000.  
c Cumulative hours worked from the week of school exit to the week of the 20th birthday, divided by 
2,000; equals zero if respondent leaves school after 20
th birthday. 
dFor state of residence and calendar year corresponding to age 18 if noncollege-goer, and last year of 
first college for college-goers. 
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Table 3:  Distributions of College Enrollment Patterns by Highest Degree Received 








All degrees   
College enrollment pattern  Num.  Pct.  Num.  Pct.  Num.   Pct.  Num.  Pct. 
Two-year college                 
No transfer   1060  56.9  244  54.6      1304  38.4 
Transfer  106  5.7  50  11.2      156  4.6 
 













Four-year college                 
No transfer  503  27.0      781  71.8  1284  37.8 
Transfer  93  5.0      143  13.1  236  6.9 
 













Two-year and four-year college                 
Transfer  100  5.4  153  34.2  164  15.1  417  12.3 
All college-goers   1862  100.0  447  100.0  1088  100.0  3397  100.0 
All transfers  299  16.1  203  45.4  307  28.2  809  23.8 
aIncludes individuals who subsequently earn a master’s, doctorate or professional degree.   28 
 
Table 4:  Sample Means and Standard Deviations for Selected Characteristics  
by Highest Degree Received and College Enrollment Pattern 



















Covariate  Nontransfer Students   






  46.61 
(.63) 
  67.76 
(.33) 
 
Number of two-year colleges in 





  2.31 
(.03) 
  2.17 
(.01) 
 
Number of four-year colleges in 





  1.40 
(.02) 
  1.59 
(.01) 
 
Cumulative years enrolled  
in 2-year colleges  
1.54 
(.02) 
    2.34 
(.04) 
     
Cumulative year enrolled  
in  4-year colleges  
  1.84 
(.03) 
      4.12 
(.02) 
 
No. person-year observations  6,592  3,466  0  1,565  0  5,300  0 
 
Transfer Students  
Percentile score, Armed Forces 















Number of two-year colleges in 















Number of four-year colleges in 















Cumulative years enrolled  
in 2-year colleges  
3.17* 
(.10) 






  2.08 
(.04) 
Cumulative year enrolled  
in  4-year colleges  










No. person-year observations  550  461  492  210  786  847  957 
a Includes individuals who subsequently earn a master’s, doctorate, or professional degree. 
* Null hypothesis that the mean for the multiple college (transfer) sample is identical to the mean for the single 
college (nontransfer) sample is rejected using a 5 percent significance level. 
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Table 5:  OLS Estimates of the Wage Effects of College Degrees and Enrollment Patterns  
  Specification 
Covariate  1  2  3  4  5 
Some college, no degree   .193 
(.013) 
       




































Associate’s degree   .286 
 (.021) 
       






















Bachelor’s degree   .485 
 (.018) 
       






















Includes controls for ability and 
number of public colleges in state 
No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Includes controls for enroll. duration   No  No  No  No  Yes 
Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) account for nonindependence of observations within person-specific 
clusters.  Sample size is 48,266 person-year observations.  See table A-2 for additional estimates for each 
specification.  
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Table 6:  Log-Wage Variance Within and Between Schooling Categories 
Within-category variance
a  Within-category variance 






1  2  3  1  2  3 
No high school diploma, S£8  2.78  72.37  72.37  72.37  2.01  2.01  2.01 
No high school diploma, S>8  12.73  67.24  67.24  67.24  8.56  8.56  8.56 
High school diploma  40.51  73.10  73.10  73.10  29.61  29.61  29.61 
Some college, no degree  23.95  104.95      25.14     
Two-year college only  14.80    104.08      15.40   
No transfer   13.66      103.89      14.19 
Transfer   1.14      96.96      1.10 
Four-year college only  8.14    103.51      8.42   
No transfer   7.18      97.39      6.99 
Transfer  0.96      147.87      1.41 
Two- and four-year college  1.02    112.54  112.54    1.15  1.15 
Associate’s degree  5.31  103.47      5.49     
Two-year college only  3.68    96.30      3.54   
No transfer  3.24      91.53      2.97 
Transfer  0.44      131.76      0.57 
Two- and four-year college  1.63    118.81  118.81    1.93  1.93 
Bachelor’s degree  14.72  129.32      19.03     
Four-year college only  12.74    130.69      16.64   
No transfer  10.98      128.73      14.14 
Transfer  1.75      137.58      2.41 
Two- and four-year college  1.98    120.53  120.53    2.39  2.39 
Sum over all categories (1- R
2)          89.85  89.67  89.45 
Between-category variance (R
2)          10.15  10.33  10.55 
Pct. gain in R
2  relative to col. (1)            1.79
b   3.93
b 
a Expressed as a percent of total log-wage variance. 
bNull hypothesis that the gain in R
2 is zero is rejected using a 5 percent significance level. 
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Table A-1:  Percent of Students Transferring by Highest Degree Received,  
Using Alternative Definitions of “Transfer” 
 
Highest degree received 
Definition of transfer 
Some college, 





a  All 
degrees 
a) Transfer=all college switches         
Percent transferring   26.0  58.9  35.1  33.3 
Number of individuals  1,862  447  1,088  3,397 
b) Transfer=all switches before                    
age 26 
       
Percent transferring   18.8  49.5  29.1  26.1 
Number of individuals  1,862  447  1,088  3,397 
c) Transfer=all college switches 
after eliminating “stopouts”
b  
       
Percent transferring  11.3  42.5  28.5  20.7 
Number of individuals  1,552  320  997  2,869 
a Includes individuals who subsequently earn a master’s, doctorate or professional degree.   
bSample excludes college-goers whose nonenrollment accounts for more than 20 percent of the 
elapsed time from first college entry to last college exit.   
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Table A-2:  Additional OLS Estimates for Specifications in Table 5  
  Specification 
Covariate   1  2  3  4  5 








































Cumulative years of work experience since 
20





































































Number of public, two-year colleges in 
state per 100,000 residents age 18-26  




Number of public, four-year colleges in 
state per 100,000 residents age 18-26 




Cumulative duration of enrollment in two-
year college (DUR2) 
        .021  
(.010) 
DUR2
2/100          -.124  
(.087) 
Cumulative duration of enrollment in four-
year college (DUR4) 
        .048 
(.014) 
DUR4
2/100          -.399  
(.133) 
Root mean square error  .538  .537  .537  .533  .533 
R
2  .232  .233  .233  .245  .246 
Note:  Model also includes calendar year dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for 
nonindependence of observations within person-specific clusters.  Sample size is 48,266 person-year 
observations.    
 